India's rise, like that of China, has been spectacular in the sense that throughout the Cold War years it had estranged ties with the United States (US). During that era, the focus of India's soft balancing and cooperation was the Soviet Union. However, in the post-Cold War years, India's strategic affairs made a volte-face. India became a strategic partner of the United States within five years of conducting nuclear tests in 1998. In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era, India enjoys the unique position as a favorite great power of the United States. In that role, India has been able to transform its economic wealth into military modernization (successful internal balancing).
A major lesson of the Cold War: Sitting on the fence keeps you out of the great power league
Of the three great powers in this study, India may be experiencing the best of both worlds. It has been interested in seeing the evolution of a multipolar global order, since such an arrangement appeared promising in terms of enhancing India's global influence. But that perspective was relevant only until the late 1990s. In the twenty-first century, the strategic environment has been improving markedly from India's vantage point. Its economy continues to grow despite problems stemming from a global economic meltdown. Its international prestige and image as Asia's second rising power is also escalating uninterruptedly. Despite these upbeat strategic affairs of the twenty-first century, United States-India ties experienced many ups and downs (mostly downs) during the Cold War years. If India could have drawn any lesson from its overall role during the Cold War, it was that neutrality in the game among nations is not exactly rewarding, if a nation has aspirations to being counted as one of the great powers.
The Elephant and the Eagle 111
The Indo-US strategic relations during the Cold War decades are most aptly characterized in the phrase 'estranged democracies,' coined by Dennis Kux, a former US diplomat with a long record of service in South Asia. In his book of the same title, Kux covered the diplomatic history between these two countries during the tenures of 11 US presidents -from Franklin Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush. In summarizing half a century of US-India relations he writes that, during those years, relations between the two countries were 'uneven -on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but, more often, just estranged'.
1 The chief reason for this estrangement was the widely diverging national interests pursued by the world's two largest democracies.
As one of India's premier leaders during its struggle to win freedom from British colonial rule and then as its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru developed a personal paradigm of conducting India's foreign policy. That paradigm depicted colonialism in all forms as evil, and arrived at the same conclusion about the superpower rivalry that started soon after World War II. For the Nehruvian paradigm, the best strategy for all countries of Asia and Africa that were shedding the yoke of colonialism and were gaining independence was to remain fully focused on developing their economies and refrain from joining either the American-or Soviet-led camps. India -along with the PRC, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, and Burma -became one of the founders of the non-aligned movement (NAM), which, as its name denoted, sided with neither superpower. Nehru envisaged the NAM as the 'third force'. As such, he thought it could play a crucial role in resolving regional conflicts, especially those that were fueled by superpower rivalry.
As much as Indian scholars in the twenty-first century indulge themselves in historical revisionism to explain India's foreign policy -based on Gita and Mahabharata (Hindu holy books) to underscore India's commitment to morality and on Kautilya's Arthashastra to emphasize the presence of paradoxical trends of morality and pragmatism in its foreign policy -one has to take that elucidation with a pinch of salt in understanding Nehru's foreign policy. Even though Nehru was born into a Brahmin family, he was a staunch secularist. As such, he demonstrated no interest in using Hindu theological perspectives in developing or explaining India's foreign policy. At the same time, as a philosopher and keen student of Fabian socialism, he manifested a deep affinity for the role of morality in conflict resolution and for the role of the state in promoting public welfare and egalitarianism. He also believed that developing nations should devote all their attention to economic development. In his utmost preoccupation with alleviating the misery of the
